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Wibren van der Burg1, Rotterdam 
The Merits of Law 




Is the law good?  
How can it be improved?  
These questions are frequently addressed, both in traditional doctrinal research and in interdisciplinary 
legal research. In this article, I elaborate a general argumentative framework for justifying evaluations 
and recommendations for legislative reform, and I identify the chains of argument for making 
evaluations and recommendations. This may help researchers to make their arguments explicit and 
transparent, and then to justify the choices made for each of the steps in the argument. This enables 
readers – as well as authors – to assess whether the argument’s conclusions are sound and convincing. A 
key problem in making these arguments concerns the choice of standards for evaluation. I suggest that 
they can be best understood in terms of the underlying values. In order to make all-things-considered 
evaluations and normative recommendations, interdisciplinary cooperation between doctrinal, socio-
legal, and legal-philosophical researchers is necessary. Therefore, individual researchers will usually have 
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“Our inability to prove that we are right does not remove the need for justification. Nor does our desire 
to rest our normative claims on secure justifications protect us from the need to justify our actions and 




Is the law good? 
How can it be improved?  
 Such questions arise frequently in the context of legal research. Law journal articles discuss, for 
example, whether a new statute fits in the system of law, whether there is tension or even conflict with 
fundamental legal principles, whether it will be effective, and whether it will promote the maximisation 
of wealth. Articles may also provide normative recommendations to legislators on how to improve the 
law, as well as suggestions on how the judiciary should decide future cases (especially in case notes).3 
 These evaluations and recommendations are often merely a short final section in a primarily 
doctrinal or socio-legal journal article. It is not uncommon to find articles in law reviews where 90 % of 
the text is devoted to a systematic presentation of the current law, with only a few paragraphs at the 
end devoted to evaluation and suggestions for reform. These evaluative and normative sections often 
resemble an attorney’s brief in which the arguments lead directly to the conclusion.4 Counter-
arguments and alternative solutions may hardly be mentioned and, if discussed at all, are easily 
                                                          
2 Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, UCLA Law Review 56 (2009), 926 
3 Sanne Taekema, Relative Autonomy: A Characterization of the Discipline of Law, in: Bart van Klink & Sanne 
Taekema, Law and Method, 2011, 35-36 argues that most doctrinal scholars go beyond mere reconstruction of the 
positive law, and include two additional aims: namely critical evaluations and recommendations for law reform. 
See also Carel Stolker, Rethinking the Law School. Education, Research, Outreach and Governance, 2014, 215. Terry 
Hutchinson, The Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming the Law, Erasmus Law 
Review 8 (2015) 3, 130-138 refers to the Australian Pearce Committee that distinguished in 1987 between 
doctrinal and reform-oriented research. According to Hutchinson (this footnote, 132), however, the category of 
reform-oriented research was also a form of doctrinal research. “Most ‘good’ quality doctrinal research goes well 
beyond description, analysis, and critique, and invariably suggests ways the law could be amended or the 
philosophy, processes or administration of the law could be improved.” There may be a difference here between 
Civil Law and Common Law traditions. My impression is that in most Civil Law countries the overwhelming majority 
of legal research is still doctrinal, and basically focuses on exposition of the positive law, with evaluation and 
recommendation only as a side-product. In Common Law countries, the focus on expository work is less dominant, 
and straightforward normative research is much more common. Cf. this quote by a US scholar: Edward L. Rubin, 
On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, California Law Review 80 (1992) 4, 903: “The purpose 
of legal scholarship is most accurately described as prescription or recommendation.” Few Civil Law scholars would 
subscribe to this sweeping statement. 
4 See J.B.M. Vranken, Mr. C. Asser’s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk recht. Algemeen 
deel.**** Een synthese, 2014, 105; Stolker (note 3), 208. 




dismissed. The standards of evaluation are often unarticulated and simply taken for granted. Moreover, 
many steps in the argument as well as many assumptions are not discussed explicitly but are left 
implicit.5 
The main reason for this style is that most legal researchers have been trained as law students. 
In the Common Law tradition, law schools train their students as lawyers who can argue a case in an 
adversarial context. However, this also encourages a style of reasoning that leads directly to the thesis 
students need to defend.6 Lawyers have to present a case in such a way that the audience is fully 
convinced, and that may involve a suggestive structuring of the narrative, the facts and the arguments, 
and the passing over of some of the counter-arguments. When reading a good case brief, one can hardly 
imagine that a reasonable person would disagree – until one reads the opponent’s brief. In the Civil Law 
tradition, students are trained to think more like a judge and to solve cases by applying ‘the law’. They 
learn to present positive law as a coherent doctrine on the basis of legislation and other legal sources. 
Until recently, writing an authoritative handbook presenting a field of law systematically was considered 
to be the highest accomplishment for legal scholars, and law students were mainly trained to write in 
this expository style.7  
However, and as various authors have convincingly argued, while this style may be good for a 
practicing lawyer, it is not a good model for a legal researcher – not even for merely expository 
research.8 We may expect from academic researchers an attitude of openness, a careful presentation of 
all relevant considerations and options, and a balanced conclusion after an impartial weighing of all the 
arguments pro and con.9 Legal research requires the impartial analysis of all relevant facts and 
arguments, and this should be done not only in the research itself but also be presented explicitly in the 
                                                          
5 Rob van Gestel & Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Why Methods Matter in European Legal Scholarship, European Law 
Journal 20 (2014), 302 observe that all too often there is a ‘jump’ to normative recommendations, “without hardly 
any evidence that what is proposed will actually lead to the intended result.” 
6 Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, University of Chicago Law Review 69:1 (2002), 9; Van Gestel & 
Micklitz (note 5), 303 with additional references. 
7 An illustration is how many Dutch treatises or handbooks present only one interpretation of the law (that of the 
author), and then mention alternative views only in a footnote with the mere addition of Anders: (“Differently:”) 
8 See Vranken (note 4), 105; Stolker (note 3), 208. Rob van Gestel, Hans-W. Micklitz & Miguel Poiares Maduro, 
Methodology in the New Legal World, 2012 (EUI working paper), 5 argue: 
“Especially the training of law students in the ‘art of persuasion’, which is an important part of the education of 
lawyers in many law schools, not only in the U.S. but to a lesser extent also in Europe, is tricky from a 
methodological perspective since it can easily spur one-sidedness and may provide an impetus to leave aside 
sources, arguments, and opinions that do not fit with the claims one wants to make.”  
9 Of course, scholars also need to pay attention to the rhetorical dimension. Appealing to convincing cases and 
examples are part of that, but biased narratives and the selective use of materials should be avoided. 




publication so that the academic forum can determine whether the arguments are sound and 
convincing.10  
Even legal expository research should acknowledge this open and discursive dimension, and 
instead of ignoring the tensions and inconsistencies in law we should be explicit in identifying them. A 
fortiori, a similar authoritative style is not acceptable in the context of evaluations and 
recommendations. The reader should be able to assess the arguments. In academic publications, choices 
should be made explicit and be justified, and the argument should consist of a balanced debate with 
regard to pros and cons. But how precisely should this be done? 
This brings us to the question central to this article: How can legal researchers, in a 
methodologically sound way, justify evaluative judgements concerning the merits of the law, and how 
can they justify normative recommendations about improving the law? 
The research question in turn raises a host of further questions. These include, for instance, 
what are the criteria for calling a law ‘good’, or, in a broader sense, for assessing the merits of a law? 
How can we make sound and convincing arguments for evaluations? How do we decide which possible 
solutions should be analysed? And how do we assess realistically which of these alternatives is best, all 
things considered? Obviously, one article cannot fully answer these questions. What it can do, however, 
is take the first step. To this end, I will develop a general argumentative framework that could serve as 
the starting point for future elaborations of research methods. The focus will be on the formal structure 
of the argument. I will identify the steps in the argument − the elements − but will not discuss how they 
can be substantiated.  
 This article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I will position and refine the research question 
against the background of the recent debate on methods of legal research. In Section 3, I will analyse 
the characteristics of evaluative and normative arguments in the context of legal research. A crucial 
issue concerns the standards of evaluation, which will be discussed in Section 4. Next, I will elaborate a 
chain of argument for evaluation – the questions that must be addressed for a full and sound argument 
(Section 5). If we want to go from an evaluation to normative recommendations, we need to address a 
number of additional issues; this will require a further chain of argument, to be found in Section 6. 
The framework I develop may at first glance seem way too ambitious. Therefore, an obvious 
objection to the approach sketched here could be that I am asking too much. This objection is discussed 
in Section 7. I will argue that the character of legal research – like law itself – is gradual. It is an 
                                                          
10 Of course, this implies that if law schools claim to provide an academic curriculum – and I believe they should – 
they should also teach different styles of reasoning and research other than just the familiar ones of legal practice. 




enterprise or project in which we may succeed to a lesser or a greater extent. Therefore, even if the 
ideal of fully sound evaluations and recommendations can never be reached, it may still be helpful to 
develop such an ambitious framework as a regulative ideal (Section 7). This may enable us to attain a 
higher degree of realisation of the ideal. I will conclude with a section containing suggestions for future 
research. There are still many gaps in this general framework, and I will identify some of them and 
suggest how they might be addressed. 
This article is not aimed simply at methodological purists. It is important that we explore ways to 
improve the quality of arguments that justify evaluations and recommendations. Improvement of the 
argumentative framework and the research methods will lead to a higher quality of legal research and 
to a better warrant for the evaluations and recommendations that result from it. Moreover, it will also 
help beginning researchers with their research design and with the presentation of their results. 
Obviously, these improvements are not merely in the interest of legal research itself. If, in current legal 
research, the evaluations and recommendations are methodologically weak, this means that 
recommendations for – or against – legal reform may sometimes be ill-advised, and even simply wrong. 
If legislators act on the basis of that advice, we may end up with a lesser quality of law.  
 
 
2. Restricting and refining the research question 
 
How might we address this complex issue? In the Introduction I have already indicated one important 
restriction. This article will focus on the formal structure of the argument, which means that I will try to 
be as neutral as possible here.11 Ph.D. candidates and more experienced researchers of every normative 
and disciplinary approach should be able to use it as a framework. Obviously I have personal preferences 
                                                          
11 Therefore, for the purposes of this article it does not matter whether a doctrinal researcher has positivist, 
interpretivist, or natural law leanings. The debate between legal positivists and their opponents may be – 
according to some interpretations – about the question of whether we can identify and reconstruct the contents of 
the law without reference to underlying moral values. In Austin’s famous words, quoted by H.L.A. Hart, Positivism 
and the Separation of Law and Morals, Harvard Law Review 71 (1958), 596: “The existence of law is one thing; its 
merit or demerit is another.” I do not think it is helpful to structure the debate between legal positivism and its 
opponents in the way Austin and Hart did it. Even natural law theorists will be able to distinguish both questions. 
See Wibren van der Burg, The Dynamics of Law and Morality. A Pluralist Account of Legal Interactionism, 2014, 65f; 
Dan Priel, Toward Classical Legal Positivism, Virginia Law Review 101 (2015), 989-991. Doctrinal researchers 
belonging to each of the competing traditions all claim to be able to reconstruct and describe the contents of the 
law in their own way. After that description each of them can always ask the separate question: what about the 
merits of the law thus understood? 




for certain types of research and for certain normative positions, but I have restricted these to the 
footnotes.12 
Further distinctions and restrictions are still necessary, however, to make the project feasible. 
First, I will confine myself to one specific class of recommendations: namely, those directed at changes 
in the substantive contents of the law. Legal research may also include other recommendations: for 
example, that the police should spend more time enforcing certain rules, that statutory norms should be 
more effectively publicised, and so on. However, because including such recommendations would make 
this an extremely broad project, I will focus on a distinct subclass of recommendations, which I will 
simply call normative recommendations, as they propose changing legal norms.13 This specific focus has 
been chosen because normative recommendations present a special challenge: they can only be fully 
justified by taking into account the internal perspective of law. An external perspective, such as that of 
law and economics or Rawlsian political philosophy, may be enough to justify a pro tanto evaluation of 
the law, a partial evaluation from a specific perspective. For normative recommendations, however, we 
need to take into account the distinct characteristics of law, not only of law in general but also the 
specific characteristics of concrete legal orders. For example, many bio-ethicists have argued that 
certain types of euthanasia can be morally justified. In order for them to go from this position to legal 
reform, they need to take into account legal characteristics such as that the law cannot easily assess 
intentions, that the law has specific problems regarding proof, and that laws have to be general and 
should not be tailored to exceptional cases, as well as the doctrinal understanding of mens rea in a 
specific jurisdiction. Thus the findings of interdisciplinary research must be translated back into legal 
terms and incorporated into the legal perspective. This problem of incorporation is a crucial challenge 
needing to be addressed.14  
                                                          
12 In various publications, I have advocated interdisciplinary cooperation between doctrinal researchers, socio-legal 
researchers, and legal philosophers. See Sanne Taekema & Wibren van der Burg, Towards a Fruitful Cooperation 
between Legal Philosophy, Legal Sociology and Doctrinal Research: How Legal Interactionism May Bridge 
Unproductive Oppositions, in: R. Nobles and D. Schiff (eds.) Law, Society and Community. Socio-Legal Essays in 
Honour of Roger Cotterrell, 2014, 129-145 and Van der Burg (note 11, arguing for sociologically informed 
jurisprudence). This cooperation is a central theme in the work of Roger Cotterrell, e.g. Roger Cotterrell, Law’s 
Community. Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective, 1995, Oxford: Clarendon Press and Roger Cotterrell, Law, 
Culture and Society. Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory, 2006. See Cotterrell (this footnote, 2006), 29: “Legal 
philosophy and legal sociology are co-workers in a common enterprise of legal explanation.”  
13 Of course, there is not always only one uniquely right solution to a problem. Recommendations could also 
suggest two or more alternative solutions to a problem; there need not always be conclusive reasons to prefer a 
specific solution. In a weak form, they could even simply imply the rejection of one or more possible solutions.  
14 See the two special issues of the Erasmus Law Review on ‘The Incorporation Problem in Interdisciplinary Legal 
Research’, 2015, edited by Sanne Taekema and me. See also Frans L. Leeuw with Hans Schmeets, Empirical Legal 
Research. A Guidance Book for Lawyers, Legislators and Regulators, 2016, 220-235; Ivo Giesen, The Use and 




Second, this article will focus only on legislation. The general research question is, of course, 
also relevant with regard to evaluations of case law and recommendations to the judiciary on how to 
decide future cases. However, the differences between Common Law and Civil Law traditions are quite 
substantial with regard to the role of legal scholarship in the development of case law.15 These 
variations would complicate a more general analysis. For the purpose of this article, therefore, the focus 
will remain on statutory law. 
Third, what is legal research? In a broad sense, it can be understood as all research on law. This 
includes doctrinal research and interdisciplinary research, as well as non-doctrinal monodisciplinary 
research such as economics, philosophy, history, or sociology. In this article, I will focus on doctrinal and 
socio-legal research, simply because they are the most common types of legal research.16 Both types can 
lead to evaluations and recommendations. However, it should be noted that there is a crucial difference 
between these two types with regard to normative recommendations. In order to formulate sound and 
concrete proposals for statutory change, we need to phrase them in terms that can be recognised by 
legislators, and we need to determine whether these formulations fit in the conceptual framework of 
the legal order. This requires a participant’s or internal point of view. This is also the stance usually 
                                                          
Incorporation of Extralegal Insights in Legal Reasoning, Utrecht Law Review 11 (2015) 1, 1-17. Péter Cserne, Making 
Sense of Nudge-Scepticism: Three Challenges to EU Law’s Learning from Behavioural Sciences, in: Alberto 
Alemanno, Anne-Lise Sibony (eds.) Nudge and the Law: A European Perspective, 2015, 281, makes an interesting 
distinction between “three kinds of challenges to the integration of empirical knowledge about human behaviour 
into (EU) law: epistemic (related to how policy-relevant empirical knowledge is generated), institutional (how this 
knowledge is channelled and transferred into legislation and other legal procedures) and normative (related to 
law’s commitment to counterfactual models of human behaviour and non-instrumental goals).” 
15 William Twining, Ward Farnsworth, Stefan Vogenauer & Fernando Tesón, The Role of Academics in the Legal 
System, in: Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies, 2003, 920-949 
16 I will not discuss the methods for doctrinal or empirical research here, but will simply assume that the doctrinal 
reconstruction of the positive law or the empirical research has been executed, or will be executed, in a 
methodologically sound way according to the methodological standards of that discipline. The question I want to 
address here is the further one of how to use the results of these doctrinal or empirical studies for evaluations or 
recommendations. On methods of doctrinal legal research, see Terry Hutchinson, Developing legal research skills: 
Expanding the paradigm, Melbourne University Law Review 32 (2008), 1065-1095; Terry Hutchinson, Doctrinal 
research: Researching the jury, in: Dawn Watkins & Mandy Burton (eds.), Research Methods in Law, 2013, 7-33; 
Hutchinson (note 3); Mátyás Bódig, Legal Theory and Legal Doctrinal Scholarship, Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 23(2010) 2, 483-514; Mátyás Bódig, Legal Doctrinal Scholarship and Interdisciplinary Engagement, 
Erasmus Law Review 8 (2015) 3, 43-54; Mark van Hoecke (ed.), Methodologies of Legal Research, 2011; Watkins 
and Burton (this footnote). For socio-legal research, see Cotterrell (note 12, both); Reza Banakar & Max Travers, An 
Introduction to Law and Social Theory, 2002; Reza Banakar & Max Travers, Theory and Method in Socio-Legal 
Research, 2005; Jonathan Verschuuren (ed.), The Impact of Legislation. A Critical Analysis of Ex Ante Evaluation, 
2009; Simon Halliday & Patrick Schmidt, Conducting Law and Society Research: Reflections on Methods and 
Practices, 2009; Fiona Cowney & Anthony Bradney, Socio-legal studies: A challenge to the doctrinal approach, in: 
Watkins & Burton (this footnote), 34-54; Leeuw & Schmeets (note 14). 




taken by doctrinal research.17 Socio-legal research generally adopts an external point of view, and does 
not focus on whether a text would fit in the legal system.18 Therefore, for this type of research, a 
number of additional steps are needed to go from evaluations to normative recommendations. For 
example, on the basis of the evaluative conclusion that citizens do not follow a law because its text is 
unclear or even incomprehensible to them, we can recommend that the text should be clarified, but in 
order to determine precisely how, we need to take into account the conceptual framework of the legal 
system as a whole. With regard to evaluations, however, purely external approaches are possible and 
legitimate. 
It is necessary to clarify the concept of evaluation. Hence, we should distinguish between pro 
tanto and all-things-considered evaluations and recommendations. A pro tanto evaluation is a partial 
one, taking into account only certain dimensions (for example, whether a statute fits in the legal system 
and conforms to the rule of law) but ignoring others (for example, whether the law is effective). An all-
things-considered evaluation takes into account all relevant dimensions on which to assess the law, and 
thus requires a much broader interdisciplinary orientation. The focus in this article is on a framework for 
all-things-considered evaluations, but, indirectly, it may also help us to better understand the 
justification for pro tanto evaluations. 
 ‘Evaluation’ is interpreted here more broadly than is often done in, for example, evaluation 
studies. Evaluation in the narrow sense usually involves assessing empirically whether a law has realised 
its explicit purposes and other valuable aims, and whether there are no negative side-effects.19 In other 
words, it provides empirical data on a number of given evaluation criteria. However, in order to evaluate 
in the broad sense, we must also determine the importance of each of the criteria, and how a negative 
result with regard to one criterion is to be weighed against a positive result concerning another 
dimension. For this, we need a theory of values and their relative importance. It is like grading a student 
paper: teachers have to assess whether the paper shows mastery of the literature, creativity, convincing 
arguments, good style, and so on, but they must also decide on the relative importance of each of these 
                                                          
17 Taekema (note 3) at 41: “The researcher takes part in the practice and reflects upon it in the same terms as the 
other participants. This does not mean that he needs to accept the practice uncritically, but it does mean that he 
needs to explain his criticisms in terms that the participants of the practice understand.” 
18 On the distinction between internal and external perspectives, see esp. Brian Tamanaha, A Socio-Legal 
Methodology for the Internal/External Distinction: Jurisprudential Implications, Fordham Law Review 75 (2006), 
1255-1274. 
19 Examples are Ray Pawson, The Science Of Evaluation. A Realist Manifesto, 2013; Michael Quinn Patton, 
Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods: Integrating Theory and Practice, 2015; G.J. Veerman (with R.J. Mulder 
& E.S.M. Meijsing), Een empathische wetgever. Meta-evaluatie van empirisch onderzoek naar de werking van 
wetten, 2013. 




criteria. Evaluation in the broad sense involves both assessing in terms of a set of evaluation criteria and 
providing an overall normative argument about the relative importance of each of these criteria. 
This leads to the formulation of two separate research questions for this article: 
1. How can we develop an argumentative framework for methodologically sound evaluative 
judgements in legal research? 
2. How can we develop an argumentative framework for methodologically sound normative 
recommendations in legal research? 
 
 
3. State of the art: terra incognita 
 
Over the past few years, there has been an intense debate on the methods of legal research.20 This 
debate has been especially heated in the Netherlands and the Flemish region of Belgium.21 An important 
reason for this increased methodological awareness is that legal research has become more 
international, comparative, and interdisciplinary in character, and this requires that one’s own methods 
be made explicit to allow for a productive dialogue across disciplines or jurisdictions.22 Moreover, the 
emergence of research schools and the organisation of methodology courses for LL.M. and Ph.D. 
                                                          
20 Hans-W. Micklitz, Guest Editorial. On the Politics of Legal Methodology, Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 21 (2014)4, 589: “In the last couple of years the market for academic legal books and law 
journals has been flooded with contributions on legal methodology.” 
For a general overview, especially of the US and European debate, see Van Gestel & Micklitz (note 5). For the 
debate in Australia, Canada, and the UK, see especially various publications by Terry Hutchinson, e.g. (note 3 and 
16); Terry Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law, 2010; Watkins and Burton (note 16). For European 
perspectives, see Van Hoecke (note 16); Van Gestel, Micklitz & Maduro (note 8). 
21 Most of these publications are in Dutch. A selection of relevant publications in English: Mark van Hoecke (2004) 
(ed.), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law, 2004; Van Hoecke (note 16); Van Klink & Taekema 
(note 3); Jan M. Smits, The Mind and Method of the Legal Academic, 2012; Stolker (note 3); Sanne Taekema, Bart 
van Klink & Wouter de Been (eds.), Facts and Norms in Law. Interdisciplinary Reflections on Legal Method, 2016; 
Leeuw & Schmeets (note 14). There have also been various special issues of academic journals (e.g., Erasmus Law 
Review 2011, issue 1; 2015, issues 2 and 3; Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 21 (2014)4). A 
special bilingual journal Recht en Methode/Law and Method started in 2011; currently, almost all contributions are 
written in the English language.  
22 Cf. Van Gestel, Micklitz & Maduro (note 8), 5. 




students have led to various texts directed primarily to student audiences.23 Methodological issues have 
probably been most widely discussed in the contexts of comparative law and empirical legal studies.24 
Surprisingly, questions regarding evaluations and recommendations have so far largely been 
neglected in this debate. Only a few authors have explicitly taken up this theme.25 Singer identifies the 
problem in a general way that includes academic research and teaching, but when he discusses methods 
these are restricted to normative arguments in the practice of lawyers and judges.26 Smits argues that 
“the ultimate question of legal science is what the law ought to be”.27 However, he remains vague as to 
how this could be done. He provides only part of the answer by arguing that comparative law may be 
used to find possible solutions and arguments28 – in other words, it functions only as a mere heuristic – 
but fails to answer how these arguments may be weighed and evaluated.29 The most explicit discussion 
is provided by Van Klink and Poort, who emphasise the normative character of legal research, and 
advocate value-based research.30 However, apart from making a distinction between values and 
standards that are internal and external to law, and advocating (with only a summary argument) that 
legal scholarship in the narrow sense should only appeal to the former, the authors provide little 
guidance on precisely what value-based research should entail. 
Of course, legal researchers frequently provide evaluations and recommendations. However, 
these studies focus only on a few values and other standards that the law is supposed to realise, and 
                                                          
23 Examples are Michael Salter & Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertations. An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct 
of Legal Research, 2007; Mike McConville & Wing Hong Chui (eds.), Research Methods for Law, 2007; Terry 
Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law, 2010; Cryer, Robert Cryer, Tamara Hervey, Bal Sokhi-Bulley with 
Alexandra Bohm, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law, 2013; Watkins and Burton (note 16). 
24 For comparative law, see Van Hoecke (notes 16 and 21); Mathias Siems, Comparative Law, 2014; Geoffrey 
Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method, 2014; Maurice Adams & Dirk Heirbaut, The 
Method and Culture of Comparative Law. Essays in Honour of Mark van Hoecke, 2014. A strong version of the 
argument that legal researchers should follow the rules of empirical research whenever they make empirical 
claims may be found in Epstein & King (note 6). For a criticism that this model does not work for primarily doctrinal 
and normative research, see Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 
University of Chicago Law Review 69:1 (2002), 153-167. 
25 Apart from the three publications discussed in the text, see esp. Leeuw & Schmeets (note 14), 220-235; Salter & 
Mason (note 23), 100-108. 
26 See Singer (note 2), 905: “Both law professors and students are in need of advice about how to think about the 
nature of morality, fairness, and justice. More importantly, they need vocabulary for talking about normative 
matters and a set of resources and methodologies for structuring relevant arguments.” 
27 Smits (note 21), 41 
28 This idea clearly resembles the suggestion by the US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann 285 U.S. 262 (1932) that states in a federal system can function as laboratories of democracy. 
29 For a similar critique, see Vranken (note 4), 153-4 and 195-6. 
30 B.M.J. van Klink & L.M. Poort, De normativiteit van de rechtswetenschap. Een pleidooi voor meer reflectie op de 
normatieve basis van het recht en de rechtswetenschap, RM Themis 6 (2013), 260 




ignore most other values that might be relevant.31 Empirical legal studies show what the effects of a law 
are, and may sometimes provide plausible predictions about the effects of proposed statutory 
changes.32 Normative law and economics provides insights into the costs and the impact on wealth 
maximisation. Doctrinal research can analyse whether the law is coherent and in line with fundamental 
principles of the legal order, while philosophy may evaluate law in the light of normative theories. Each 
of these approaches provides relevant building blocks for a complete evaluation and for 
recommendations, but not a full argument. These studies are important in their own right, but 
insufficient as the basis for a complete, all-things-considered evaluation.33  
The limitations are illustrated by empirical evaluation studies, which usually take as the standard 
for evaluation the purposes of a statute (or more broadly a policy programme), and investigate whether 
these have been effectively realised.34 Most studies evaluating legislation, executed or at least initiated 
by government agencies, have a similarly narrow focus on realisation of the goals of the statute, and 
include only a limited range of possible other effects.35 In the Netherlands, for example, the emergence 
of legislative science has led to the formulation of “general principles of proper legislation” and to 
various suggestions for lists of criteria on which to evaluate legislation.36 However, these criteria focus 
                                                          
31 Some authors claim to provide an all-things-considered evaluation by translating and reducing certain values to 
one common value, or simply by declaring other values irrelevant. An example is the attempt by some law and 
economics scholars to focus only on welfare maximisation, and trying to put prices on non-monetary goods. For 
critiques on this reductionist approach, see Jules Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare: Fairness Versus Welfare. By 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Yale Law Journal 112 (2003), 1511-1543; Renny Reyes, Alessandro Romano & 
Cecilia Emma Sottilotta (2015), Regulatory Impact Assessment in Mexico: A Story of Interest Groups Pressure, Law 
and Development Review 8 (2015) 1, 99–121. 
32 For ex ante evaluative studies of legislation, see Verschuuren (note 16). 
33 For similar critiques on the limitations of various types of legal research that try to avoid fully addressing 
normative issues, such as doctrinal research and economic analysis of law, see Singer (note 2), 913ff. 
34 Two examples: In the widely used handbook Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods: 
Integrating Theory and Practice, 2015, 18 the question of programme evaluation (of which legislative evaluation is 
a subtype) is formulated as “whether the people involved are accomplishing what they want to accomplish.” Only 
a few other minor remarks are made about the underlying values throughout the 806-page book; there are not 
even index entries for values or norms. In his case study on a ban on smoking in cars carrying children, Pawson 
(note 19), 174-5 only focuses on studying empirical aspects of the ban. Evaluation should, in his view, be based 
only on evidence, but he pays no explicit attention to how to go from facts to recommendations. 
35 In the Netherlands, many new statutes contain explicit requirements to evaluate them after a number of years. 
Veerman (note 19), 13 estimates that 10 % of the yearly production of statutes in the Netherlands contains an 
explicit clause requiring evaluation. In Veerman’s meta-evaluation of 67 of these evaluation studies, the research 
question it concerns is simple: namely, whether the statutes have realised their goals. Side effects are only 
indirectly included insofar as they are relevant to the realisation of these goals. 
36 See e.g. P.J.P.M. van Lochem (2015), Kwaliteit van wetgeving als keuze, in: Kwaliteit als keuze - 
kwaliteit(sbeoordeling) van rechtspraak, wetgeving en rechtswetenschappelijk onderzoek (Handelingen NJV), 2015, 
141-242, esp. 150-167; Veerman (note 19); Willem J. Witteveen, Alternatieve regulering. De vele gezichten van de 
wetgever, in: Alternatieve regelgeving (Handelingen NJV), 2007, 1-66; Willem Witteveen, De wet als kunstwerk. 
Een andere filosofie van het recht, 2014. 




primarily on technical-legal and instrumental aspects, and do not address the substantive political 
dimension of legislation. The same is true for Regulatory Impact Assessments in the context of the EU 
associated with the Better Regulation project.37 As a result, evaluation studies may identify certain pro 
tanto deficiencies in the law on the basis of certain relevant values, but do not make the leap from those 
partial deficiencies to a full all-things-considered evaluation, let alone to all-things-considered normative 
recommendations.  
To conclude, we may find relevant building blocks and partial insights in legislative evaluation 
studies and other disciplines. However, there are two major deficiencies in these studies. The first is that 
they focus on only one or a restricted set of standards of evaluation. The second is that they do not 
provide methods for integrating into a broader interdisciplinary perspective the partial insights 
produced by various disciplines. Thus there is no integrated framework that can justify all-things-
considered evaluations and recommendations. For this more holistic aim, the academic literature 
provides no guidance.38  
Sceptics may argue that such an integrated framework is impossible and undesirable, and that 
empirical or doctrinal legal researchers should simply refrain from providing evaluations or 
recommendations.39 It is not seen as their job, because there is no adequate methodology that would 
allow them to execute it properly. Such an approach, in line with traditional positivist theories of 
science, is a respectable position.40 However, there are good reasons not to accept it. First, the 
conclusion that no sound methodology exists is too hasty, as long as we have not even seriously tried to 
                                                          
 
37 For the EU see Principles of good regulation, 2003; Anne C.M. Meuwese, Impact Assessment in EU Lawmaking, 
2008; Verschuuren (note 16), 3. 
38 It is remarkable that in Ph.D. and LLM student guides for doing legal research these broader evaluative and 
normative dimensions are at best discussed in only a few scattered remarks. See e.g. Hutchinson (note 23), 176; 
Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley & Bohm (note 23), 10. Some guides even don’t mention them at all, and restrict 
evaluation to empirically determining whether a law is effective; examples are Watkins and Burton (note 16); 
McConville & Chui (note 23). The most extensive discussion is provided by Salter & Mason (note 23), 100-108. 
39 For a defence of such a position, see e.g. Anne Ruth Mackor, Legal doctrine is a non-normative discipline: An 
argument from abstract object theory, in: Taekema, Van Klink & De Been (note 21), 127-149. A relativist version of 
this argument is that, as values − and consequently evaluations − are mere preferences, it is wrong for lawyers or 
researchers to impose their views on others. Of course, as Singer admits, “we have no iron-clad way to prove a 
claim of morality or justice.” Joseph William Singer, Critical Normativity, Law and Critique 20 (2009), 27-42, 31. 
However, that sometimes only a weak justification is possible for normative claims does not imply the relativist 
conclusion that every attempt to justify is arbitrary. 
40 It is respectable, but as a pragmatist I reject the presuppositions of this positivist view of science. Elsewhere I 
have defended the claim that an integration of doctrinal, empirical, and normative analyses is possible and 
desirable. (See Taekema & Van der Burg (note 12)) However, because I want to present a neutral framework here, 
I will leave aside this discussion on the merits of positivism. 




construct one. Second, legal researchers have been making evaluations and recommendations for a long 
time, based partly on practical experience and implicit knowledge, and partly on theoretical insights and 
research. Even if the methods can be improved, there is no reason to assume that the current 
evaluations and recommendations are so bad that they are worthless. Third, if legal scholars were to 
refrain from making evaluative judgements and recommendations, to whom then should society turn 
for expert advice on legal reform? If legislation is not merely a matter of whims and political 
preferences, we should expect academic researchers with some expertise in the specific field of law to 
be able to contribute to a critical analysis of legislation and to explore the possibilities of legal change.41 
It seems unjustified to exclude from discussions on legal reform those with expert knowledge of the 
subject. It would be like saying that because medical doctors make mistakes, we should leave medicine 
to lay people altogether. 
Even so, there is an important warning inherent in the sceptical position, and it is that not all 
legal research should be oriented towards evaluations and recommendations. Indeed, I will argue below 
that researchers should refrain more often from making evaluations and giving recommendations, not 
only because of an inadequate methodological basis but also because it is not always appropriate to do 
so. Purely expository doctrinal work and purely empirical socio-legal research are important in their own 
right, and need not be followed at all by evaluative and normative judgments. Nevertheless, I also want 
to defend the position that sometimes it is possible and desirable to make justified evaluations and 
recommendations, and that, if we want to do so, we should try to do it in as methodologically sound a 




4. The Characteristics of Evaluative and Normative Arguments 
 
Legal research is an argumentative practice. Researchers put forward arguments to support their claims, 
and present counter-arguments to undermine the claims of other researchers. For example, they refer 
to legislation and case law but also to normative principles to defend their reconstruction of doctrine. 
They use experiments and observations as well as references to generally accepted theories to support 
                                                          
41 In Wibren van der Burg, The Need for Audacious Fully Armed Legal Scholars: Concluding Reflections, in: 
Taekema, Van Klink & De Been (note 21), 265-286, I have argued that legal scholars should more often take up 
their responsibility to give advice involving their field of expertise. 




their empirical claims. This argumentative character is very explicit when it comes to evaluations and 
recommendations. Such arguments are not a matter of mathematical proof, providing a strictly 
deductive line of argument.42 However, they are also not empirical proof, as they cannot rely – at least 
not fully – on relatively strict methods for establishing facts and theories based on facts. I suggest that at 
least the following characteristics of arguments in the context of legal research should be taken into 
account.43 Most of these characteristics hold for arguments in academic research in general, but some 
of them are more specific to arguments that lead to evaluations and normative recommendations. 
 
A. Arguments are addressed to an academic forum 
The community of scholars is the primary forum for assessing the research,44 and expert peers should 
decide on the quality of the research and of the arguments. The only – albeit imperfect – way to judge 
whether arguments in legal research are sound and convincing is to submit them to this type of forum, 
and to see how well they can stand up to that trial. The method is imperfect because the forum of 
course can be wrong,45 but even then, the researcher can claim that an ideal forum would accept his 
arguments.  
To enable the forum to assess the arguments, the researcher cannot simply report the results of 
her research. She has to spell out each of the links in the chain of argument. Of course, this is a basic 
requirement for every type of research, including doctrinal research. Did the researcher arbitrarily 
exclude data (such as specific cases or statutes) that do not support her conclusion? Did she make clear 
why in hard cases she chose one solution rather than the other? This is even more important in 
                                                          
42 Cf. Singer (note 39), 28. 
43 I focus on such arguments in the context of legal research, although much of what is said here could also apply 
to arguments in the context of legal practice as well as in various types of non-legal disciplines such as ethics. 
There is an immense body of literature on legal reasoning in general to which I cannot do justice in this context; 
obviously, much of it would be relevant for a more detailed analysis of arguments in the context of legal research. 
44 Cf. Vranken (note 4), 37ff. Various groups of legal practitioners – judges, lawyers, legislators – may also 
constitute relevant fora for the presentation of legal research. They may assess the research on whether it is 
convincing and useful for their practical purposes, but this is not a criterion of quality or soundness of the research 
as academic research. For example, in this assessment by members of the legal practice, there may be a bias 
against research that fundamentally criticises the legal order – and therefore may be regarded as of little practical 
use – and towards research that suggests practical solutions and quick fixes for concrete problems. Moreover, 
these ‘consumers’ of legal research are usually not much interested in whether these practical suggestions are 
based on methodologically sound research. The question of whether the research is sound should be assessed by 
the academic forum. 
45 To avoid misunderstanding, I should mention that the forum’s acceptance of an argument as sound is not the 
criterion or the ground for its soundness. A researcher with a brilliant mind ahead of its time may be unable to 
convince the forum that her argument is sound. Nevertheless, it is part of the practice of scholarship and research 
that we present our research to the forum in such a way that it can be critically assessed. 




evaluative and normative arguments. The forum must have all arguments and counter-arguments on 
the table. Basically, this role of the forum is the reason for various other characteristics and 
requirements. 
 
B. Criteria for assessing arguments are soundness and convincingness 
We should make a distinction between sound and convincing arguments. Disagreement is inherent in 
law and in legal research – as in other disciplines such as philosophy.46 Even the ideal forum need not 
fully accept the argument as convincing.47 The primary standard for determining the quality of 
arguments is not weaker but it is different: the argument must be sound, that is, it must be logically 
valid and it must be defensible.48 It is like many interesting cases argued in supreme courts: even if one 
side loses in the end, it is worth trying because there is a defensible case. Moreover, the court may turn 
out to be wrong in the long run. When editors or supervisors have to decide whether to accept an article 
or a dissertation, the criterion should be soundness.49  
Of course, when a reader of a journal article decides to write a critical response, she will focus 
both on soundness and convincingness. A researcher hopes that the academic forum will accept the 
argument as both sound and convincing. However, convincingness has a more subjective dimension that 
may vary with the audience. For example, a supervisor may accept a Ph.D. candidate’s critique on her 
own views as a defensible and highly original one, and therefore accept the dissertation as sound 
research fully deserving of a doctorate, but still reject the critique as unconvincing. There are many 
academic debates in which both parties fully understand each other’s positions, even regard them as 
respectable and defensible, but are not convinced by the arguments. 
 
C. Arguments are embedded in controversies 
                                                          
46 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 1999; Raymond A. Belliotti, Justifying Law. The Debate over 
Foundations, Goals, and Methods, 1994 
47 If only because the academic forum includes a diversity in disciplinary, theoretical and methodological 
backgrounds. 
48 Eveline Feteris & Harm Kloosterhuis, Law and Argumentation Theory. Theoretical Approaches to Legal 
Justification, in: Van Klink & Taekema (note 3), 255 define a sound argument as being a logically valid one with 
acceptable premises. Instead of acceptable, however, I prefer the weaker notion of defensible. 
49 Both convincing and sound are vague concepts that may give rise to controversy. Whether an argument is 
considered sound or convincing, depends partly on the context and on the audience. However, that there is a grey 
zone of vagueness and controversy does not imply that we can do without the distinction between sound and 
convincing. 




Law is characterised by differences in opinion. This holds for legal practice but also for legal research. Of 
course, on many issues there is – or seems to be – a broad consensus, but research often focuses on 
points of controversy or on points where the matter is still open and undecided. The controversial 
character of arguments should be fully acknowledged. Therefore, an academic publication should not 
merely put forward views supporting the conclusion. It should also mention alternative views, represent 
them impartially according to the principle of charitable interpretation, and then make an argument as 
to why these alternative views are not, or not fully, convincing. Only in this way can members of the 
academic forum fully assess the argument.50 
 
D. Arguments are defeasible51 
Evaluative and normative arguments rarely lead to knock-down conclusions. Usually they make a 
conclusion merely plausible: for example, the suggestion that a tax rule should be amended.52 The 
conclusions are not based on strict deductive reasoning, but on defeasible reasoning. The conclusion is 
plausible if the reasons pro outweigh the reasons contra. Even so, these conclusions are only 
provisional; they can always be outweighed or invalidated by new arguments. In order for the forum to 
assess whether the argument should be accepted, all relevant reasons pro and contra must be discussed 
in the article, and it must be argued why these reasons are – or are not − sound and plausible. 
Moreover, it must be explained why the reasons against this conclusion are considered weaker than the 
reasons in favour.  
  
E. Arguments are coherentist 
Evaluative and normative reasoning is coherentist.53 We do not merely apply a normative theory to 
concrete issues − the theory is also developed and refined in the light of moral intuitions and the 
                                                          
50 See also Belliotti (note 46), 237. He argues that the fact of controversy does not exclude there being right 
answers in some cases; moreover, it is not a question of anything goes. He states “Not just any world vision passes 
the test for a legitimate legal ideology, nor are we committed to the simple-minded proposition that one vision is 
no better or worse than any other.” 
51 On defeasible reasoning, see Giovanni Sartor, Defeasibility in Legal Reasoning, in: Jordi Ferrer Beltrán & Giovanni 
Battistta Ratti (eds.), The Logic of Legal Requirements. Essays on Defeasibility, 2012, 108-136 
52 I use plausible here in a broad sense. It includes the degree of certainty for factual statements and the degree of 
acceptability for normative and evaluative statements.  
53 Of course, in this general formulation, this is a highly controversial statement, as there are many foundationalist 
normative theories that could be used in evaluating the law. I have argued for coherentist justification in various 
publications (e.g. Wibren van der Burg, Dynamic Ethics, Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (2003), 12-34), but cannot 
repeat the analysis in this article. Foundationalist ethical theories may be used for an external criticism of law, but 
usually only lead to a pro tanto evaluation, based for example on the value of efficiency or justice. In order to 
combine all relevant pro tanto evaluations into an all-things-considered evaluation, we need to balance and 




relevant facts. In moral philosophy, John Rawls elaborated this basic idea into a method that he called 
reflective equilibrium.54 A version of reflective equilibrium theory can provide an adequate description 
of what doctrinal scholars do when they construct legal doctrine.55 More importantly for this article, I 
submit − but without elaborating further here − that reflective equilibrium can also model evaluative 
and normative reasoning in the context of legal research. This going back and forth takes place 
throughout the research process; right up to the end, theoretical conclusions may be refined in the light 
of concrete intuitions.  
The academic publication, however, only presents the end result: namely, a coherent argument. 
This argument will often be presented in a one-directional way, in which references to facts, strong 
intuitions, normative principles and so on are all put forward as reasons to support the argument or to 
undermine and weaken counter-arguments. The dialectical process of discovery is ignored in the 
presentation. As a consequence, there may be significant differences between the context of discovery 
and the context of justification. In this article, I will focus on the latter: namely, on how results of the 
research process are presented to the academic forum. The distinct question as to how the process of 
discovery can be structured methodologically is left for future research. 
 
F. Arguments require evaluation standards 
In order to evaluate, we need evaluation standards. In legal research, these standards are often implicit 
and taken for granted. Common implicit standards for doctrinal scholarship are doctrinal consistency 
and coherence, and the fundamental principles or values of the legal order. In law and economics, the 
standards are usually variations of welfare, preference satisfaction, and efficiency. For socio-legal 
studies, the standards may be the purposes of a statute as well as the derived value of effectiveness in 
realising those purposes. However, apart from these familiar standards, there may be many more that 
are relevant to evaluation. The choice of standards raises many difficult questions, which I will discuss in 
Section 5. 
                                                          
integrate them, and this can best be done in a coherentist process of reasoning. Most importantly, in order to 
produce sound recommendations, evaluations have to be translated and incorporated in an internal legal 
perspective. The internal perspective of law in which a doctrine is critically reconstructed and suggestions are 
made to change the law requires a hermeneutic approach, which implies coherentism.  
54 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971. On reflective equilibrium, see Norman Daniels, Justice and Justification: 
Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice, 1996;  Wibren van der Burg & Theo van Willigenburg, Reflective 
Equilibrium, 1998. 
55 For reflective equilibrium as applied to law, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 1978, 160f.; Marsha P. 
Hanen, Justification as Coherence, in: Michael Alexander Stewart (ed.), Law, Morality and Rights, 1983, 67-92; 
Singer (note 2), 976. 





G. Arguments are complex  
Arguments in legal research are usually complex, consisting of a set of reasons and auxiliary reasons for 
and against reasons. The links in a chain of argument can be quite complex and long: for instance, “This 
statute is a good law because A, B, and C; A is plausible because X and Y and despite Z, and so on.” There 
must be a full chain of argument, in which each of the links is made explicit and then made plausible. 
The argument is as strong as its weakest link. A famous cartoon by Sidney Harris shows a complex 
mathematical proof with formulas on a blackboard, in which one of the links is “then a miracle occurs”. 
The comment of a colleague is “I think you should be more explicit here in step two.”56 This cartoon 
provides a cautionary tale for evaluative and normative arguments. No step should be taken for granted; 
every step should be made explicit and made plausible. If there are missing or implausible links, the 
whole argument may fall apart.  
 
H. An argument for normative recommendations is comparative 
Arguments for normative recommendations are comparative in two respects. First, they must compare 
the suggested solutions to the status quo. It should be demonstrated not only that the alternative is 
better according to one evaluation standard but better all-things-considered. Legal reforms are no zero-
sum games, but an improvement in one evaluation standard may sometimes lead to deterioration in 
terms of another standard. For example, elaborating a statute in more precise and legally correct words 
may result in a higher degree of consistency, but could decrease compliance because this technical 
language is so complex that ordinary citizens no longer understand the rules. Second, they must 
compare the suggested solutions to possible alternative solutions. Again, this should be an all-things-
considered assessment, because it is likely that different solutions will score higher on different 
dimensions. 
 
I. Arguments may appeal to authorities or generally accepted ideas 
John Rawls has argued that “justification proceeds from what all parties to the discussion hold in 
common.”57 In principle, every reason given in an argument can be met with a further “Why?”58 There is 
usually a point where truths are held to be, if not self-evident, at least so generally accepted that further 
                                                          
56 http://www.sciencecartoonsplus.com/pages/gallery.php (last visited on 22 February 2018) 
57 Rawls (note 54), 580 
58 See Singer (note 2), 903: “We know the feeling of being confronted with the ‘why?’ question and not knowing 
what to say after ‘because…’, yet feeling we should be able to say something.” 




argument may be deemed superfluous: for example, “Torture is wrong”, “Free speech is a fundamental 
human right”. For practical purposes, such appeals to generally accepted ideas or − as Rawls calls them − 
provisionally fixed points will usually suffice.59 Lawyers use a specific type of provisionally fixed points: 
namely, legal sources. Examples of these are references to a recent Supreme Court decision or to a 
recent statute. In the world of Civil Law, an authoritative handbook may also provide a provisionally 
fixed point. Lawyers are accustomed to such appeals to authority, whereas this type of argument 
outside legal contexts is often regarded as fallacious or at least suspect. 
However, even in expository legal research such an appeal to authoritative sources must be 
treated with caution.60 After all, a supreme court can overrule its precedent, an author might be 
mistaken, or an unforeseen interpretation of a statute may emerge. For evaluative and normative 
arguments, the appeal to authorities is even more questionable. John Rawls may be the most influential 
political philosopher of the last century, but this is not sufficient reason to accept appeals to his 
theory.61 If we apply his theory, we must provide further reasons why it is adequate in this specific 
context. A similar point can be made with an appeal to judicial interpretations of specific concepts or 
arguments. For example, the fact that the US Supreme Court (in Bowers v Hardwick) excluded 
homosexual relations from protection by the right to privacy was even in 1986 not sufficient reason for a 
legal scholar to accept the majority’s conception of privacy.62 After all, plausible alternative conceptions 
had been suggested by the Court’s minority, in the literature and by other courts: for instance, by the 
ECHR in the Dudgeon case.63 If we want to evaluate court cases or legislation critically, judgements and 
statutes may be sources for arguments and interpretations, but they are not authorities. 
 
 
5. Standards of Evaluation 
                                                          
59 Rawls (note 54), 20. See also Singer (note 2), 966: “Evaluative assertions can provide an answer to the ‘because 
clause’ by appealing to the things we in fact already believe.” 
60 See also Taekema (note 3), 48. 
61 Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 4 (1992), 79-104, 
92 rightly criticises “the startling absence of argumentation in most discussions of philosophical issues” in law 
journals. Too frequently, authors merely quote statements by philosophers rather than provide arguments for why 
these statements are correct (or why the author believes it is justified to restrict the analysis to these 
philosophers). In my view, it is certainly not unique to legal scholarship to put “citation in place of argument” 
(Leiter (this footnote), 92); it is quite common among trained philosophers as well.  
62 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) 
63 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 22 October 1981, No. 7275/76. Of course, the fact that this interpretation of 
privacy was later rejected in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) illustrates clearly that academic researchers 
should be very cautious with regard to grounding the standards for evaluative analysis in the authority of court 
decisions. 





As mentioned in the previous section, legal researchers use a variety of standards for evaluative 
purposes. Take the example of a 10 % tax increase on cigarettes. On the one hand, there are very 
specific evaluation criteria, such as changes in tax revenues, in the numbers of smokers, and in the 
average consumption of cigarettes per smoker. Although it may not always be easy to gather the data, 
these evaluation criteria are clear and specific. On the other hand, there are also quite general values, 
such as public health and individual freedom. Although they are obviously relevant to the evaluation of 
the tax increase, it is not easy to interpret and operationalise them, let alone to determine the 
implications of the tax raise for these standards. Both for the specific and general standards, a crucial 
question has to do with how much importance they should have in an all-things-considered evaluation.  
This example illustrates various problems. First, some standards are directly valuable, such as 
public health and freedom, whereas others are indirectly valuable, such as increased tax revenues or a 
decreased number of smokers. We need additional arguments as to why they are important. Second, 
evaluation standards are diverse in terms of specificity and generality. Third, it may be difficult to 
interpret and operationalise the more general standards and to determine how important they are. For 
example, what does freedom or public health mean? Is public health important as such and not merely 
in terms of health care costs? Fourth, if we have to choose because we cannot research everything, 
which standards are the most important? Fifth, how can we combine this diversity of standards in an all-
things-considered evaluation or recommendation? 
 My suggestion is that these questions can best be addressed if we assume that standards of 
evaluation refer directly or indirectly to fundamental values. As the word evaluation suggests, we need 
to assess whether and to what extent certain values have been realised in order to determine whether 
the law is good. Thus, the notion of values can provide a common conceptual framework to integrate 
the various evaluation standards. However, a focus on values as the common denominator is only a first 
step in addressing these five issues. 
First, we should make a distinction between direct and indirect standards. Some evaluation 
standards are based only indirectly on values. For example, doctrinal consistency is clearly a standard for 
evaluation, but it is at most an instrumental, dependent value rather than an ultimate value. We need 
further arguments as to why consistency is valuable, which can be found in values such as the rule of 
law, equal treatment, or legal certainty. The same holds for effectiveness. Effectiveness is only an 
instrumental value insofar as the goals served by the law are valuable. We would not value effectiveness 
if a law had immoral purposes − for example, the suppression of free speech − we would prefer instead 




that the law be quite ineffective. Many evaluation standards may need a process of transformation in 
order to be understood in terms of underlying values. How valuable is it that tax revenues increase and 
that numbers of smokers decrease?64 Again, for a full evaluation, researchers should make explicit why 
certain evaluation standards are important, and especially how significant they are compared to other 
standards. Especially for this latter aspect, the issue of balancing, it is important to have a common 
denominator of values. 
 Second, we need to address the question of how to translate or relate the variety of standards 
to values. I suggest that − as subcategories of the broad category of evaluation standards − a distinction 
between values, conceptions of values, and criteria may be helpful here. Values such as freedom or 
consistency can be interpreted in various, conflicting ways; in the terminology of Rawls and Dworkin, 
these concepts are open to a variety of conceptions.65 These more specific conceptions usually cannot 
be applied directly to concrete cases, but must be specified or operationalised as criteria in order to be 
useful for testing and evaluating. A researcher must explicate the conception she chooses and justify the 
choice, as well as explicate and justify the choice for specific criteria.  
Although the threefold distinction I present here moves from the more abstract to the specific, 
that is not always the order of analysis in real research. On the one hand, empirical researchers 
frequently start with concrete criteria (such as tax revenues and numbers of smokers) because that is 
what they can find with the help of their empirical methods. However, if they want to use their results 
for all-things-considered evaluations and recommendations, they must analyse and translate these in 
terms of underlying values, and explain which conceptions of these values they use and why. On the 
other hand, philosophers usually focus on more abstract values such as justice or freedom, and have to 
go from these to conceptions and then to operationalisations.  
This brings us to the third issue: namely, that of interpretation and operationalisation. Values 
can give rise to different interpretations or conceptions. For example, the value of legality can be 
interpreted in terms of the eight principles of Lon Fuller, or of the eight principles of Joseph Raz, but it 
can also be interpreted to refer to procedural values and substantive values.66 This variation is not 
something that will simply disappear after elaborate conceptual analysis, as values are essentially 
                                                          
64 To add even more complexity: these questions can not be answered in general, but vary with the context. For 
example, how important the increase in tax revenue is, depends on the budget deficit.  
65 Rawls (note 54), 5; Dworkin (note 55), 103 and 134 
66 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 1969; Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law. Essays on Law and Morality, 1979, 
210-229; Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law as a Theater of Debate, in: Justine Burley (ed.), Dworkin and his Critics, 
2004, 319-336. For an overview see Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning, The Rule of Law. Definitions, Measures, 
Patterns and Causes, 2014 




contested concepts.67 This means that they are inherently open to a variety of partly overlapping, partly 
incompatible conceptions.  
For instance, there are many different interpretations of democracy, ranging from direct 
democracy to proportional representation and a district system. If we want to examine whether a bill 
introducing a referendum improves the democratic quality of our constitutional order, we must discuss 
the various conceptions of democracy, and give arguments as to why we choose one specific 
interpretation. As the question is one of improving our existing political system, we must start with 
those theoretical conceptions that fit our order, or that are at least not too much in tension with it. This 
will restrict the range of plausible conceptions, but there still may be various conceptions that meet that 
criterion. For a full evaluation, it may be necessary to assess the referendum in light of each of these 
conceptions. 
 This example illustrates that we should sometimes choose more than one conception, and 
determine whether the bill is consistent with each of them. We may call this conceptual triangulation. 
Whereas methodological triangulation uses different methods to gain a richer insight into a 
phenomenon, conceptual triangulation uses different conceptions to obtain a more comprehensive 
overview as to whether a phenomenon is consistent with a specific value. In most cases, however, we 
will have to choose one specific conception to make assessment feasible. Again, although there are no 
easy guidelines here, we should argue why we have made this choice. 
A connected problem is that of operationalisation.68 Once we have chosen a specific conception, 
we must determine how to assess it by formulating more specific criteria. It may not be measurable in a 
quantitative way, but we must be able to judge objectively whether or not the law fails to meet the 
standard.69 Of course, the availability of methods may restrict which criteria we are able to study. When 
we design a research project, there is usually a dialectical interplay between available methods and 
possible criteria. We determine in the light of possible methods what criteria can be feasible and vice 
versa. However, when we present the results, we should begin with the more general values and 
conceptions, and then explain the specific criteria and the methods that have been used to study them.  
                                                          
67 See Wibren van der Burg, Law as a Second-Order Essentially Contested Concept, Jurisprudence 8 (2017), 230-
256, in which I argue that the value orientation of essentially contested concepts is crucial in explaining the 
essential contestedness. 
68 The notion of operationalisation is well known in social sciences, but I suggest that it is useful as well in the 
context of doctrinal research. The construction of a more elaborate conception of a value is basically a theoretical 
exercise, whereas deciding how to assess or measure it for specific purposes is basically a methodological issue; it 
partly depends on the available methods as to how we should operationalise the value. 
69 For a discussion of how to elaborate the concept of the rule of law in conceptions and operationalisations, see 
Møller & Skaaning (note 66). 




Operationalisation does not merely require a more specific standard; it also requires that we 
decide what degree of realisation would be desirable and realistic.70 Because we live in an imperfect 
world, a full realisation of values is not possible. Nor, as we may learn from Radbruch and Fuller, is it 
always desirable, because the full realisation of one value may lead to perverse effects and to a lesser 
realisation of other important values.71 Values can conflict. It would not be fair criticism of a law against 
murder that murders are still taking place and therefore the law does not work. The same holds for laws 
combating, for example, discrimination or environmental pollution. Perhaps for a superficial evaluation 
it may seem enough to show that a certain value is not completely realised. However, we may ask what 
is the worth of such a limited evaluation. We know that we do not live in a perfect world, and that our 
laws are in many ways not completely coherent, just, democratic, or sustainable – they are often flawed 
in the light of whatever substantive values we would want to use for evaluation. This shows that we 
have either to set reasonably attainable cut-off points or to argue why it is not possible to do so, and 
merely designate a grey zone of somewhat acceptable degrees of realisation. 
Fifth, there is a broad range of possibly relevant values. Due to practical limitations of time and 
disciplinary competence, most legal researchers use only a small set of general values or concrete 
criteria. For example, they focus on doctrinal consistency and coherence, combined with an analysis of 
whether a statute or judicial decision can be justified in the light of fundamental legal principles.72 This 
may suffice for a pro tanto evaluation, but even then the question arises as to how can researchers 
determine on which values and criteria they should focus, and how can they justify their choice. 
Nevertheless, for a full, all-things-considered evaluation, and especially for useful normative 
recommendations, we need to include all possibly relevant standards.73 
Obviously, this includes distinctly legal values, such as legality and legal certainty, but the range 
is much wider. In principle, every value can be relevant for the evaluation of law. They need not be 
                                                          
70 This need not always be done in advance, but it should at least be discussed explicitly when the results are 
presented in a publication. 
71 For the unavoidability of conflicts or antinomies between the core ideals of law but also between different 
aspects of one ideal, see Fuller (note 66), 41 and 45; Gustav Radbruch (1950 [orig.1932], Legal Philosophy, in: The 
Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin, (ed. E. W. Paterson (1950), K. Wilk transl.), 1950, 109-112; Sanne 
Taekema, The Concept of Ideals in Legal Theory, 2003, 181-183. 
72 On coherence, see Nicola Lacey, Contingency, Coherence, and Conceptualism: Reflections on the Encounter 
between “Critique” and “the Philosophy of the Criminal Law”, in: Philosophy and the Criminal Law. Principle and 
Critique (ed. Antony Duff), 1998, 9-59; Salter and Mason (note 23), 100; Amalia Amaya, The Tapestry of Reason. An 
Inquiry into the Nature of Coherence and its Role in Legal Argument, 2015. 
73 A further issue is how to deal with the conflicts between those standards. Some philosophers, but certainly not 
all, hold that values are incommensurable; consequently, there is often no decisive argument to prefer one 
solution over another. As my aim in this article is to provide a neutral framework, I will leave the issue of 
incommensurability aside.  




broadly accepted – controversial values may also be used. For example, the researcher may include 
values such as marital fidelity or animal integrity if she can make a defensible case for them. After all, 
the test of a good argument is not whether it is convincing but whether the academic forum considers it 
sound.74 Researchers did not have to wait until there was a broader acceptance of homosexuality before 
they could appeal to an inclusive conception of equality to criticise legal discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation. This example illustrates that the set of values − and the set of conceptions of those 
values − that may be used in evaluation is open, and that it may change. It seems likely that our views 
with regard to the environment and animals will change in the future. New values may emerge, and 
attempts to develop and use such emerging values should not be discarded because they are currently 
controversial. 
This open character of the set of possibly relevant values presents major problems for 
researchers. There is no simple checklist that they can tick to see whether a law is justified in view of the 
underlying values. More importantly, if they want to restrict their analysis to only one or two values (for 
example, fairness and efficiency in the evaluation of tax law), they have to justify this choice by making 
plausible that other values are less relevant. Alternatively, they can stick to a mere pro tanto evaluation, 
but then they should mention this restriction explicitly as well. There is no easy solution to this problem; 
the only feasible guideline is that no choice, no restriction can be taken for granted but must be justified 




6. The Chain of Justification: The Structure of Evaluative Arguments 
 
A recurrent theme in this paper is that we should make every step in the argument explicit, and that we 
should justify each one. In order to identify the most important steps, I develop in this section a basic 
structure for presenting evaluative arguments. By submitting them in a linear fashion, I present them in 
the context of justification. In reality, legal research is often hermeneutical and circular, going back and 
forth between the different steps until a coherent story can be told.75 The various steps are thus not 
linear, but are tested and refined during that process. The context of discovery may therefore be quite 
unsystematical, but when we want to justify evaluative conclusions to the forum, the arguments must 
                                                          
74 This does not mean that anything goes; these controversial values must still be minimally defensible.  
75 With regard to the hermeneutical character of legal research, see Lacey (note 72); Taekema (note 3), 45-48. 




be presented systematically. I suggest that we should present the justification as a clear chain of links in 
which each link is made both explicit and plausible. A full evaluative argument should at least address 
the following six questions. 
 
A. What is the precise subject of evaluation? 
Research projects usually focus on only a small part of the legal order: a court case, a statute, or a 
specific subfield of law. This is not a neutral choice. A biased evaluation results, for instance, if we gauge 
the fairness of one specific tax rule that provides deductions that mostly benefit the rich but we do not 
include the broader tax structure in which the rich pay progressively higher tariffs. The same would hold, 
of course, but with a different bias, if we were to assess only the progressive tax structure without 
acknowledging that the rich usually profit more from deductions than the poor. The choice of topic and 
its demarcation should therefore be discussed explicitly, and justified in the light of what consequences 
the specific demarcation might have, especially in terms of biases. 
 
B. What are the most important values to be used in the evaluation of this specific subject?76 
Which values are relevant is partly relative to the field of study. In tax law, economic efficiency may be a 
very important instrumental value but it is less so in most areas of constitutional law. In both cases, 
however, we should discuss not only efficiency but also the underlying values for which efficiency is 
instrumental, such as economic growth – an instrumental value as well, in turn referring to intrinsic 
values such as individual happiness. We should not restrict the set of values arbitrarily. A small research 
project usually does not allow us to include all relevant values, and probably not even the most 
important ones. However, if we do make a choice we should justify it. If the choice can affect the 
soundness of the evaluative conclusion, this should be mentioned explicitly and its implications should 
be discussed.  
 
C. Which conceptions of these values are chosen? 
As discussed above, each value may lend itself to different conceptions. Researchers should discuss the 
most plausible of these, and argue why they have chosen to focus on a specific one, or − in the event 
they use conceptual triangulation − on those specific ones. 
 
                                                          
76 To avoid misunderstanding, I should repeat that going from values to criteria is simply the order of presentation. 
In research, the hermeneutic process is a circular interplay between choosing values and choosing criteria.  




D. How can these conceptions be operationalised into evaluation criteria, and what methods will be 
used to assess them? 
The criteria need not be quantifiable. The decision to opt for qualitative research can be, of course, 
perfectly legitimate; in doctrinal research, quantitative methods even play a minor role. Even so, the 
criteria must be specific enough to make an objective assessment possible. Again, the choice of these 
criteria and methods must be justified explicitly. Moreover, as suggested above, we need to make 
explicit the degree of realisation that would suffice to place the law above criticism – even if this is a 
grey zone rather than a clear cut-off point.  
 
E. How should the subject be evaluated in view of each of the criteria? 
This, of course, is the proof of the pudding, since after choosing the evaluation criteria and the methods, 
we need to determine whether these criteria have been met. This must be done according to the 
methodological standards of the disciplines used for the evaluation, and can therefore vary widely. 
Although this is one of the most important links in the argument – and in most articles will even 
comprise the bulk of the text – I will not discuss it further here. Because it depends on the 
methodologies of each of the disciplines involved, it would require a very detailed and broad discussion. 
 
F. How do we balance conflicting pro tanto evaluations? 
Even if we have restricted the set of values and evaluation criteria, it is very likely that our evaluation 
will provide a mixed image. With regard to certain criteria the evaluation is positive, with regard to 
others negative. In those cases, we must discuss whether the overall balance is positive or negative, and 
make explicit the arguments for an overall judgement. This is made even more difficult, on the one 
hand, by the problem that values are often difficult to compare or even incommensurable and, on the 
other, by the contextual variation in the interpretation and the importance of values.  
 
The academic forum can only assess whether the conclusions about the merits of the law are sound and 
convincing if each of the previous steps has been made explicit and the choices made at each of them 
have been made plausible. These five steps will usually result in a pro tanto evaluation of the law − pro 
tanto, as it is based only on the values that were included in the evaluation. The inclusion of other 
values – or other conceptions and operationalisations of these values – might have led to a different 
evaluation.  




At first glance, a restricted pro tanto evaluation might be all we need. As I will argue below, it 
may be a legitimate aim of academic publications to provide this. However, on methodological grounds 
it will not always be possible to restrict our evaluation. Even for a pro tanto evaluation, we must 
determine how much realisation of the chosen values, as specified in concrete criteria, is required. For 
example, a high degree of legal certainty may lead to a suboptimal realisation of justice, or to a 
dysfunctional and outdated legal order that cannot keep up with societal changes.77 In order to 
determine the optimal realisation of a certain value, we have to take into account the desirable and 
possible degrees of realisation of other values as well. Therefore, even when we want just a pro tanto 
evaluation, we may need to study other values − and the criteria derived from them − apart from the 
ones we have chosen as our primary focus. 
A full, all-things-considered evaluation should – at a minimum − include judgements about the 
most important instrumental and intrinsic values, and thus must include analyses of doctrinal coherence 
and conformity with fundamental principles of the legal order such as legality, intended effects, side-
effects, and costs as well as of the most important political and moral values at stake. A pro tanto 
evaluation may be presented as a full evaluation only if we can make plausible that we have included 
the most important values and criteria relevant for this subject, or that the inclusion of other values and 
criteria might not make a substantive difference. However, to make this plausible requires at least a 
superficial discussion and informed guesswork about the most important values and their realisation, 
which is still a substantive burden of argumentative proof.78  
 
 
7. From Evaluation to Normative Recommendations 
 
An evaluation may lead to the identification of concrete problems. This raises the question of whether 
the law can and should be changed in order to solve these problems. Sometimes the solutions may 
seem obvious. If doctrinal analysis shows that a rule in a statute is unclear, we should reformulate it. If a 
recent tax reform has unexpected unfair effects for particular groups of citizens, we should make the 
rules more just.  
                                                          
77 This is a core thesis in the work of Radbruch, who holds that none of the three elements of the Rechtsidee can be 
fully realised, nor should we aspire to do so. Radbruch (note 71), 109-112. 
78 For informed guesswork, see Pawson (note 19), 81. 




 However, recommendations may not always be that easy. If there is an inconsistency between 
two rules, we may need a further argument to decide which of the two rules needs to be adapted. More 
importantly, solving one problem often creates another, as the promotion of one value may have a 
negative impact on other values. If we want to confiscate more weapons and drugs, providing the police 
with additional surveillance powers such as stop-and-search policies may seem effective. However, 
when these policies especially target members of minority groups in a discriminatory manner, they may 
also infringe upon civil rights and damage trust in the police. 
 Formulating methodologically sound normative recommendations usually requires a broad 
interdisciplinary perspective, because mere pro tanto recommendations have limited value and may 
even be misleading if not presented carefully with all due restrictions. In order to make fully justified 
recommendations for legal reform, even if the primary method was that of traditional doctrinal 
research, the possible effects and the normative-philosophical justification also need to be addressed. 
Perhaps they are not highly relevant or important, but if that is the argument not to include them, it 
should be made plausible, and that requires at least a minimal discussion of those dimensions. 
 This means that, even more strongly so than with regard to evaluations, justifying 
recommendations usually requires cooperation between at least three disciplines: doctrinal, empirical, 
and normative-philosophical. Each of these has major contributions to make, since recommendations 
will not be fully justified if one of them is missing. This does not exclude partial pro tanto 
recommendations, but we should be extremely cautious in using them as the basis for actual legislative 
reform.79  
A chain of justification similar to that described in the previous section can be constructed for 
the argumentative links leading to normative recommendations. The starting point of this chain is that 
the evaluation has resulted in the identification of a clearly formulated problem. 
 
A. Is the problem important enough? 
                                                          
79 This points to an important limitation to the usefulness not only of purely doctrinal approaches but also of 
empirical approaches such as law and economics or evidence-based legal studies. They can provide important 
partial insights, but these need to be supplemented by a broader analysis, including normative-philosophical and 
doctrinal research, in order to warrant all-things-considered evaluations and recommendations. When these types 
of empirical legal studies claim to provide more than a restricted partial evaluation, these claims do not take 
sufficiently into account the restrictions of the research.  




Not every problem is important enough to be addressed explicitly. Legal change comes with a cost. If it 
happens frequently, it might weaken legal certainty and trust in the legal order.80 Even a simple 
legislative change costs substantive amounts of time and money. Therefore, in order to justify 
normative recommendations that legal norms should be changed, it should be demonstrated clearly 
that there really is a serious problem that needs to be solved immediately. 
 
B. What are the possible solutions to the problem? 
Rather than already going for a seemingly obvious solution, we should pause to consider other possible 
alternatives. This is especially important because some alternatives may require thinking out of the 
box.81 The best solution with regard to an inconsistency between two rules need not always be to 
change one of them. The inconsistency could be an indication of a more fundamental tension. For 
example, animal law is often not fully coherent, because it has developed organically from earlier times 
when the interests of animals were largely ignored to one in which we are still discussing how to take 
animal welfare more seriously. We may expect further inconsistencies when introducing new animal 
welfare legislation. Perhaps the best approach to removing these inconsistencies requires a 
fundamental review of the basic principles of animal law, and that fundamental revision may affect rules 
that were at first glance not related to the existing inconsistency. In other situations, the solution might 
be to abolish legislation. Instead of opening up civil marriage to same-sex couples, for instance, marriage 
could simply have been abolished − as many feminists and gay-rights activists have advocated. This 
would have had the additional advantage that it would also have ended the unequal treatment of 
citizens who are single or live in polyamorous or multiple-parent arrangements. A weaker version of this 
would have been to eliminate all legal rules that differentiate between citizens on the basis of marital 
status. Of course, not all suggestions from outside the box need to involve such radical changes. 
Nevertheless, it may be useful to search for possible solutions that are less obvious. 
 One way of doing so might lie in comparative research. Jan M. Smits has argued that 
comparative law may help us to find solutions and arguments that have been discussed in other 
jurisdictions, and to examine how they have worked there.82 We could also undertake an 
                                                          
80 One of Fuller’s principles of legality is that of constancy through time (Fuller (note 66), 79-81). Raz (note 66), 
213-214, formulates the same principle as the requirement that laws should be relatively stable. 
81 According to Jonathan Verschuuren and Rob van Gestel, Ex Ante Evaluation of Legislation: An Introduction, in: 
Verschuuren (note 16), 5, often only the option preferred by the authorities is considered in ex ante evaluations, 
and there is generally “a lack of imagination as it comes to alternative ways of regulation.” 
82 Smits (note 21) 




interdisciplinary comparison with ethics, for example, to gain inspiration from the ways in which ethical 
theories deal with issues such as responsibility, care, or organ transplants.83 
 
C. What are the most attractive and defensible solutions? 
There will sometimes be many alternative solutions, in which case we must make a shortlist of those 
that are most attractive and defensible. To do so, we should scan all possible alternatives, select those 
that seem most attractive and defensible, and then justify our choice. The default option is always to do 
nothing, because the transition costs, the uncertainty as to whether the expected improvements can be 
realised, and the possibility of unexpected negative side-effects always provide good pro tanto 
arguments for not changing the law. Hence, the inaction alternative should always remain on the table 
in this comparison. Another alternative is usually to wait for – or actively work towards – a more gradual 
development of the law in the desirable direction: for example, through the gradual evolution of case 
law or, in a federal system, through experimenting and creating support at the state levels before 
federal or even constitutional law is changed. 
 
D. What are the pros and cons of each of the alternatives? 
In order to make a recommendation, the various alternatives should be compared. In a pro tanto 
evaluation, most likely the pros and cons will have been restricted to a specific perspective: for instance, 
doctrinal or socio-legal. For fully justified recommendations, such a restriction is not possible. It should 
include all relevant dimensions: namely, the doctrinal and the empirical but also the normative-
philosophical. Therefore, when the initial pro tanto evaluations are based on doctrinal research, sound 
recommendations require that we should also pay attention to the possible effects of a suggested legal 
change and to the normative-philosophical dimension. It should at least be made plausible that the 
change will be effective in bringing about the expected outcomes, and that the result will not be unjust. 
An important source for estimating possible effects could be, again, comparative legal research.84 For 
example, in order to assess whether the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia is recommendable, we 
might want to study its effects in states that have done so, and we should also compare it with the 
effects of legalisation of physician-assisted suicide. 
 
                                                          
83 Cf. Peter Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality, 2002; Eric Tjong Tjin Tai, Duties of Care and Ethics of Care: A 
Case Study in Law and Ethics, in Van Klink & Taekema (note 3), 329-340; and Wibren van der Burg, Law and Ethics: 
The Twin Disciplines, in: Van Klink & Taekema (note 3), 175-194, respectively. 
84 Smits (note 21) 




Only when all four steps are made explicit, and each step in the argument is made plausible, can the 
academic forum assess the argument and thus determine whether the recommendations are sound and 
convincing. If certain links in the chain are missing or are insufficiently supported by arguments, the 
forum would have to assess on the basis of insufficient information and arguments. Even if empirical 
research were to show that stop-and-search policies are effective in combating crime, we must be made 
aware of the possible sacrifices in terms of important legal values such as privacy, bodily integrity, and 
non-discrimination. Does it fit in a legal system with a rather restrictive approach towards granting 
invasive powers to the police? These aspects also have to be considered before we can make a sound 
recommendation to change the law. 
 
 
8. Asking Too Much? 
 
I suspect that by now many readers are keen to raise the objection that the aforementioned is asking 
too much. They may claim that even if it is true that we should improve the argumentative quality of 
publications when they contain evaluations and normative recommendations, the framework that I 
have suggested is unrealistic. They may argue that it requires such a broad and thorough 
interdisciplinary approach that providing evaluations and normative recommendations will hardly be 
possible,85 and for that reason we had better stick to the familiar partial approaches that thus far have 
served us reasonably well. 
 My suggestions, if accepted, could indeed have practical consequences for legal research. The 
most important one is that researchers would become more methodologically reflective, and would 
make their methodological choices explicit and thus more open to assessment and criticism.86 I consider 
that this would be an important gain. The additional implications could go two ways: legal researchers 
might become more cautious and they might become more ambitious.  
 On the one hand, if becoming more cautious, they will sometimes refrain from evaluations 
because they realise that the research they have done simply does not provide a sufficient basis. More 
frequently, they will refrain from recommendations because, as I have shown, these usually require 
                                                          
85 The complexity of good evaluations is a central problem in Pawson (note 19). See xvi: “Complexity skyrockets.” 
He concludes that it is sometimes necessary to leap. (Ibid, 30)  
86 Of course, such an increased methodological reflectiveness and explicitness is not relevant only for evaluations 
and recommendations but may also impact legal research in general. 




additional arguments and a broader interdisciplinary perspective.87 When constructing the chain of 
justification, they will realise that their research provides insufficient support for important links in the 
argument. For example, they have focused only on the doctrinal aspects of a statute, which is not 
enough to justify far-reaching recommendations of reforming it without further information about the 
possible effects.  
Actually, it would not be a bad consequence at all if researchers were to refrain more often from 
making evaluations and recommendations. Doctrinal or empirical research need not always lead to 
evaluations, let alone to normative recommendations. The research can be of a high quality in its own 
right. In fact, refraining from evaluations in instances where there are insufficient grounds to justify 
them may improve the quality of scholarly publications. If a high-quality expository analysis is followed – 
and overshadowed – by superficial evaluative comments, this could have a negative impact on how 
readers assess the full article. In fact, I expect that it even provides some comfort to researchers in the 
early stages of their career when we state explicitly that evaluations and recommendations need not be 
an obligate part of doctoral dissertations and other publications but that, on the contrary, refraining 
from making them is a respectable and legitimate choice. 
It may be useful to add that certain types of legal research that are not discussed in this article 
rarely give rise to evaluations, such as legal history or conceptual analysis. Publications in which one 
specific argument or counter-argument is developed may also merely allow very restricted pro tanto 
evaluations − or undermine such evaluations − but they may still be very important for the academic and 
public debate. This may provide a building block for a fuller evaluation. Again, this is an example of how 
acknowledging methodological restrictions may improve the quality of the research. Let me give an 
example. In the debate on opening up marriage to same sex couples, apart from appeals to religion and 
tradition, two arguments are frequently central to the opponents’ claim. One is an empirical claim: 
namely, that children are harmed when they are raised by a same-sex couple; the other is a normative 
claim: namely, that there is an alternative, such as a registered partnership, that has precisely the same 
                                                          
87 There may, of course, be other reasons for refraining from recommendations: e.g. because the 
recommendations would be too obvious or too controversial – or both − to different audiences. For example, in 
their report on the Rohingya in Myanmar, Penny Green, Thomas MacManus & Alicia de la Cour Venning, 
Countdown to Annihilation: Genocide in Myanmar, 2015, conclude that a genocidal process is underway. As 
genocide is generally considered one of the worst possible crimes, this statement implies a very clear and strong 
evaluation. However, they provide no recommendations. I think all possible suggestions might have weakened the 
report. Either they would have been obvious to some and unacceptable to others (the suggestion that the 
Myanmar government should acknowledge that genocide is underway and should immediately stop the process) 
or they would have been controversial because uncertain strategic choices might be involved (the suggestion of 
actions by the international community). 




legal consequences as marriage, and therefore there is no need to change a law with regard to 
traditional marriage. It is, of course, completely legitimate if an author wants to debunk only one of 
these two arguments. She could restrict herself to an overview of empirical studies showing that the 
first argument is empirically false, but she could also restrict herself to arguing that the second 
argument should be rejected because it would leave discrimination intact at the symbolic level. Here, 
restriction to one discipline, either empirical or philosophical, can be preferable to trying to cover both 
in one article. 
Researchers may also become more cautious in a different way. By reflecting on the pro tanto 
and restricted character of their evaluations, they may be able to demonstrate the limitations and 
strengths of their argument. If they admit openly that their evaluation is only pro tanto, based on a 
restricted doctrinal analysis or on studying the direct effects of a new statute, this makes explicit in 
which respects readers can rely on the outcomes. Moreover, they can indicate where fellow researchers 
might want to search for additional information: for example, by mentioning which relevant values and 
criteria have not been included in the research. They could even do so in the final section – common in 
other disciplines – which law publications rarely have: namely, in a section entitled ‘suggestions for 
further research’. In short, by clearly demarcating the methodological restrictions of their argument, 
researchers improve rather than weaken the standing of the publication, and they invite the forum of 
fellow researchers to analyse critically their chain of justification as well as to build on and to 
supplement it. 
Justification is a matter of degree. If we try to construct a chain of justification, we may discern 
that some links are strong and others are decidedly weak. Acknowledging this explicitly is not a sign of 
weakness but a contribution to legal scholarship. Perhaps some of the chains are no more than a 
reference to one example, or to a few newspaper articles about the perverse effects of a new statutory 
rule. These sources may be the basis for weak but still initially plausible hypotheses about the effects.88 
If – and precisely because – it is indicated that these sources are relatively weak, this may also invite 
fellow researchers to investigate and supplement or reject the weakest links in the argument. 
On the other hand, researchers may become more ambitious. The extensive framework 
developed in this article is gradualist. Full realisation is impossible − it is a matter of degree.89 
                                                          
88 With regard to empirical, legal, and normative claims, we should accept that we often cannot go beyond what 
Pawson (note 19), 81 calls “informed guesswork”. I should add that I use this phrase in a broader sense than 
Pawson, as he applies it only to empirical claims. 
89 There is no simple standard to determine when we can be satisfied that we have produced a sound and 
convincing justification, also because what we should aspire to depends on the context and the forum. With regard 




Justification is not a mathematical proof but a demonstration that should be as sound and convincing as 
possible to the academic forum. I hope that the proposed framework will challenge individual 
researchers as well as the larger research community – including reviewers for academic journals – in 
various ways to become more ambitious in achieving a higher degree of justification. For example, 
doctrinal research projects might be broadened by trying to find non-doctrinal evidence in the literature 
that may supplement the doctrinal findings.  
Legal academic culture is still highly individualistic. Compared to social sciences, let alone to 
biomedical and natural sciences, few articles are co-authored.90 Perhaps legal researchers should adapt 
to the necessity of team work; if they really want to come up with justified evaluations and 
recommendations, they cannot do it alone. Certainly, interdisciplinary research is not easy, but it is a 
road that at least a substantive group of legal researchers should take. However, it is not always 
necessary that we all become part of interdisciplinary teams. The argumentative framework provides a 
regulative ideal not so much for individual researchers but for legal research as a collective enterprise. 
Researchers are part of a community of scholars. They may contribute individually to a piece of the 
puzzle, and then others may build on that contribution. One important function of methodological 
sections in other disciplines is to make the research replicable, as well as show to other researchers 
what they do not have to do over again because it has already been solidly investigated. In legal 
research, replicability may not always be possible.91 Nevertheless, the readers should be able to 
distinguish which steps in the argument they accept because they are sound and convincing, and which 
steps need further backing up – or criticism. 
A final remark on the claim that justification is a matter of degree. This makes it often possible 
to rely on shortcuts and provisionally fixed points. Let me recap three characteristics of evaluative and 
normative reasoning: It is addressed to a specific forum; it is plausible and defeasible; and it may rely on 
authoritative sources. As I argued above, quoting Rawls, arguments start from what the parties to a 
dispute have in common. If we can reasonably expect that the relevant forum accepts certain claims, we 
                                                          
to empirical claims, Pawson (note 19), 188 argues “we simply stop when we are satisfied that explanations are firm 
enough to carry the policy decision.” This basically holds not only for empirical claims but also with regard to legal, 
evaluative, and normative claims. 
90 Epstein and King (note 6), 47-48 observe that whereas in leading political science journals almost half of the 
articles were co-authored, in the six US law journals they analysed only 5 % were co-authored. 
91 Smits (note 21), 39; Vranken (note 4), 140-141 argues that legal doctrinal research is not replicable, but should 
be ‘retraceable’ or ‘followable’ (in Dutch original navolgbaar, cf. German nachvollziehbar). It should be presented 
in such a way that the various steps in the research process can be followed critically by other researchers. 




do not have to provide a full argument for them.92 The forum may accept that, in general, the most 
recent decisions of the Supreme Court contain the law of the United States. Therefore, if there is a 
recent clear judgement on an issue, for doctrinal claims we need not discuss all decisions of the 
Supreme Court over the last twenty years, let alone of lower courts.93 A claim that the United States has 
accepted same-sex marriage can be supported by a simple reference to Windsor.94 There are other 
points as well where we can rely on authority. If there is a good overview article in a prestigious peer-
reviewed journal about the effects of certain types of legislation, we need not mention hundreds of 
other articles on the same topic. Similarly, we may refer to an authoritative exposition of legal doctrine 
by the leading doctrinal scholar in the field. If we appeal to democracy or the rule of law as values, we 
usually need not argue why they are values – although we may be required to argue why we choose a 
specific interpretation. Plausibility is a matter of degree, and there are no clear criteria with regard to 
when the degree of plausibility is high enough.95 Moreover, a provisional fixed point may unexpectedly 
become controversial: for example, widely accepted doctrinal claims may sometimes suddenly be put in 
doubt. 
The framework developed in this paper may make it possible for researchers to present a more 
convincing argument to the forum, because when an argument’s relative weaknesses are acknowledged 
explicitly, its relative strengths are highlighted. The most important result of using a stricter framework 
for evaluations and recommendations, therefore, should be an improvement in the quality of the 
research and in the quality of the evaluations and recommendations. Sketching the full framework may 
serve as a regulative ideal. Like all ideals it is impossible to realise; moreover, full realisation is usually 
undesirable. If a researcher were to attempt to meet the full framework criteria completely, she would 
probably never publish any evaluations. Nevertheless, it is good to keep an eye on the ideal, and to use 
it as a critical yardstick to determine whether we might be able to do better. 
 
                                                          
92 Perhaps we will need to do that if challenged by a critic. Legal argument is discursive, which means that we 
should anticipate the most important objections to our argument, and should be willing to answer any reasonable 
objections we did not anticipate when these are made.  
93 In my view, this specific characteristic that law is a hermeneutical and argumentative discipline relying on 
authoritative sources, also when it includes empirical claims, is overlooked by Epstein and King (note 6). For this 
critique as well as other criticisms, see Goldsmith & Vermeule (note 24); for a reply not fully addressing this point, 
see Lee Epstein & Gary King, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship: A Reply, University of Chicago Law Review 
69 (2002), 191-209. 
94 United States v. Windsor, 570 (2013) 
95 Goldsmith & Vermeule (note 24), 164-165 argue that because of limited resources there is “a tradeoff between 
accuracy, on the one hand, and timeliness and relevance on the other.” In normative argument, there is a similar 
tradeoff between plausibility and timeliness and relevance. 





9. Conclusions and suggestions for future research 
 
In this article, I have suggested a general argumentative framework for justifying evaluations and 
normative recommendations. Legal researchers should make their argument explicit and transparent, 
and justify the choices made for each of the links in the argument. If they are unable to do so, perhaps it 
is better to refrain from making evaluations and recommendations. The advice would be to do it well or 
not at all. Because this article is only a first step in exploring these themes, I conclude with a number of 
suggestions for further research. There are at least four major clusters of questions that should be 
addressed. 
The main cluster concerns the central category of values. Are conflicting values 
incommensurable, or are they merely difficult to compare? Is it possible to identify and analyse the most 
important values? How can legal values such as doctrinal coherence and legality be operationalised, and 
how important are they? How can we transform efficiency and effectiveness in terms of underlying 
substantive values? Can we make more robust the steps from values to specific conceptions and then to 
specific criteria? 
The second cluster concerns the differences between the context of discovery and the context 
of justification. The argumentative framework for justification has been presented in a linear way. 
However, in hermeneutic and coherentist disciplines such as doctrinal research and legal philosophy, the 
process of analysis is circular, going back and forth between all the relevant elements. How can we 
structure the process of argumentative analysis in the context of discovery? Can we develop frameworks 
of normative justification that will provide guidance for designing and executing legal research projects? 
A third problem is that the framework is based on an unattainable ideal of full justification. To 
make the framework more useful in guiding actual research projects, we should try to develop 
legitimate partial strategies and defensible shortcuts. Some examples of partial strategies have already 
been mentioned, such as focusing on one specific normative argument or making carefully restricted pro 
tanto evaluations. Another strategy regards the use of authoritative materials, from using court 
materials to undertaking secondary literature analysis as a supplement to doctrinal research. In order to 
help researchers, we should try to identify and elaborate more of these reliable shortcuts.96 
                                                          
96 See also Péter Cserne, Facts and norms in the behavioural assumptions of law, in: Taekema, Van Klink & De Been 
(note 21), 105: “Here, the question is whether we know enough about a certain phenomenon to base policy on 
this knowledge. (…) Experience has shown various pragmatic ways of dealing with this epistemic challenge: relying 
on the overlapping consensus among scientists; using rules of thumb, levels of significance; or simply conducting 




A final problem is that of incorporation. I have argued that to make justified recommendations 
we need to adopt the internal perspective of law. This means that the results with respect to other 
disciplines must be transformed so that they can fit into a legal framework with its distinct epistemic, 
institutional, and normative characteristics and constraints. This need for incorporation, however, raises 
many questions with regard to both the fact-value distinction and interdisciplinary integration.97 
We could list many more issues that need to be addressed in elaborating this argumentative 
framework, but the above-mentioned are the most important ones. It is my fervent hope that this 
article will soon be outdated because other researchers will have taken up these challenges and 
constructed a much richer framework.98 
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more empirical (case, event) studies without an underlying model.” (For similar remarks see Cserne (note 14), 
285.) 
97 For example, see Giesen (note 14); Leeuw & Schmeets (note 14), 225-233; the special issues of the Erasmus Law 
Review 8 (2015), 2 and 3 on the incorporation problem in interdisciplinary legal research; and Taekema, Van Klink 
& De Been (note 21) on the relation between facts and norms in interdisciplinary legal research. 
98 One further suggestion would be to analyse critically the frameworks developed in this article. This has been 
explorative research. I collected ideas and elements from many sources as well as from my experience in teaching 
research methods and in coaching Ph.D. candidates and junior researchers. I used coherentist philosophical 
analysis to combine these elements into coherent frameworks. For explorative research, such a heuristic and 
unmethodical approach is defensible, but in order to elaborate, test, and refine it, additional research might be 
useful. Empirical and philosophical research could provide ways to do so.  
